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Abstract
1 
Conditional cash transfers are a departure from more traditional approaches to social 
assistance that represents an innovative and increasingly popular channel for the delivery 
of social services.  Conditional cash transfers provide money to poor families contingent 
upon certain behavior, usually investments in human capital such as sending children to 
school or bringing them to health centers on a regular basis.  They seek both to address 
traditional short-term income support objectives, as well as to promote the longer-term 
accumulation of human capital by serving as a demand-side complement to the supply of 
health and education services.  Evaluation results from a first generation of programs 
reveal that this innovative design has been quite successful in addressing many of the 
criticisms of social assistance such as poor poverty targeting, disincentive effects, and 
limited welfare impacts.  There is clear evidence of success from programs in Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua in increasing enrollment rates, improving preventive 
health care and raising household consumption.  Despite this promising evidence, many 
questions remain unanswered about conditional cash transfer programs, including the 
replicability of their success under different conditions, their role within a broader social 
protection system, and their long-term effectiveness in preventing the inter-generational 
transmission of poverty.  One of the main challenges facing policymakers today is how to 
build off of the established success of conditional cash transfer programs to tackle the more 
difficult issues of improving the quality of health and education services and providing a 
more holistic approach to both social protection and chronic poverty.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are a new type of social assistance program that 
represents an innovative approach to the delivery of social services.  As their name implies, 
conditional cash transfers provide money to poor families conditional upon investments in 
human capital, usually sending children to school and/or bringing them to health centers on 
a regular basis.  The cash transfer is aimed at providing short-term assistance to families 
often in extreme poverty without the means to provide for adequate food consumption,  
while the conditionalities aim to promote longer term human capital investments, 
especially among the young. CCT programs are part of a new generation of social 
programs that use demand-side financing to target the poor that includes school voucher 
programs and certain subsidized health insurance schemes.  These programs’ reliance on  
market principals, using demand-side interventions to directly support beneficiaries, is a 
marked departure from traditional supply-side mechanisms such as general subsidies or 
investments in schools, health centers and other providers of social services.   
 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aimed at providing social assistance and 
improving children’s human capital have been established in numerous countries in recent 
years, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean where they were originally 
developed. The most popular type of program includes a combination of health, education 
and nutrition objectives and includes initiatives such as Mexico’s Programa de Educación, 
Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA
2) launched in 1997, the first large scale CCT program 
both in the region and globally; Colombia’s Familias en Acción program (FA); Honduras’ 
Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF); Jamaica’s Program of Advancement through 
Health and Education (PATH); Nicaragua’s the Red de Protección Social (RPS); Bolivia’s 
Beca Futuro; Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano; Chile’s Subsidio Unitario Familiar; 
and, recently, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program.  Other programs provide education grants 
only, including Brazil’s established Programa Nacional de Bolsa Escola,  the Programa de 
Erradicaçao do Trabalho Infantil (PETI), and Agente Joven.  A third category are focused 
on health and nutrition objectives including Brazil’s  Bolsa Alimentação and  Cartão 
Alimentação.    
 
Several of these programs have acquired an important role in individual countries’ 
portfolio of poverty alleviation strategies. In 2002, Mexico’s CCT program reached more 
than four million families, representing 20 percent of the Mexican population, and 
commanded and annual budget was around Mex$18 billion (US$1.8 billion equivalent to 
approximately 0.32% of GDP). In Jamaica, PATH is being introduced as a national 
program to replace three major income transfer programs, while improving targeting and 
cost-effectiveness. Its 2004 annual budget is US$23 million (0.32% of GDP). In Colombia, 
the program was introduced as a cornerstone in their new safety net strategy designed to 
respond to the worst recession in close to 70 years; the approximately US$100 million 
allocated for 2002 is equivalent to 0.12% of GDP. Other established programs in the 
region are considerably smaller both in terms of scope and financing, such as Nicaragua’s 
 
2 In March 2002,  PROGRESA changed its name to  Oportunidades  and introduced several changes to its 
objectives and operational features, including an expansion to urban areas.   2
Red de Protección Social with its annual budget of approximately US$5 million for 2002. 
However, in Brazil, Bolsa Familia is presently being introduced as an overarching welfare 
reform program that will consolidate numerous smaller programs to become the largest 
CCT program internationally, both in terms of coverage and financing. 
Each of the seven conditional cash transfer programs reviewed for this paper promotes 
long-term human capital accumulation as a primary objective, recognizing its role in 
breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty (see Table 1). This focus is a 
departure from traditional social assistance strategies that have used redistributive transfers 
as a means for short-term poverty alleviation during times of crisis. Correspondingly, CCT 
programs focus primarily on children as the recipients of the human capital investments 
promoted by the programs and closely monitor compliance with conditionalities as a pre-
requisite for receiving the transfers. The implementation of CCT programs has been 
accompanied by systematic efforts to measure their ability to promote human capital 
accumulation and understand their  broader impact on households’ behavior, a marked 
departure from the limited attention that has been paid to rigorous impact evaluations in 
the past in the Latin America region.  Results from the evaluations applied to the first 
generation of these programs are now available and are shedding light on CCT programs’ 
effectiveness.   
This paper reviews the experience of the Latin America and Caribbean region in 
introducing a widespread social experiment that provides an innovative alternative to 
traditional social assistance programs.  After placing CCTs in the social assistance context 
in Section II, the paper provides a brief overview of the objectives and characteristics of 
CCT programs in Section III, explores the main innovative features associated with CCT 
programs in Section VI, reviews available evidence concerning their impacts in Section V, 
and reflects upon program design and the available evidence on effectiveness in Section VI 
before concluding in Section VII. 
 
II.  The Social Assistance Context 
 
Conditional cash transfers can be classified within the family of social assistance programs 
that constitute a country’s formal, publicly provided safety net system.  These programs’ 
traditional role has been  as a transfer mechanism aimed at  redistributing income and 
resources to the needy in society, helping them to overcome short-term poverty during 
periods of crisis.  Formal, publicly-provided safety nets may take the form of cash or 
income transfers, such as child allowances; transfers in kind, such as food or housing 
subsidies; or they may provide income support to the vulnerable by providing jobs in an 
emergency situation through a public works program.   
 
Social assistance programs have generally been considered separate from social insurance 
systems, not sharing the latter’s focus on addressing market failures or providing longer-
term solutions to risk management.  Conversely, social insurance systems have 
traditionally not contemplated non-contributory social assistance components with targeted 
benefits for the poor.  This separation is now being questioned, however, as the increased 
sophistication of social assistance programs on the one hand, and the growing use of 
poverty-targeted minimum social insurance benefits such as minimum pensions on the 
other, are introducing more of a continuum between assistance and insurance.   3
 
What has sparked this evolution in social assistance policy?  Social assistance programs 
have traditionally been associated with a focus on reducing current poverty with little 
attention to issues of long-term, structural poverty.  The problem has been viewed as a 
trade off between short-term equity objectives achieved through redistribution and long-
term objectives of efficient economic growth.  The short-term equity focus has often been 
associated with the use of perverse incentives developed as part of crisis-driven approaches 
that have often been criticized  for reducing the current labor supply, crowding out private 
transfers and encouraging dependency.  
 
Recently, the design of safety nets policies and programs has evolved, going beyond the 
limited focus on short-term poverty alleviation and income redistribution, encompassing 
longer-term economic growth and human capital development objectives.  This maturation 
is underpinned by a renewed debate on the theoretical rationale for social protection.  The 
renewed debate centers on a re-examination of the presumed the trade-off between equity 
and efficiency, which is being questioned by new perspectives on the long-term social and 
economic costs of uninsured risks and unmitigated inequalities, and the potential role of 
safety nets in addressing some of those problems.  As explained by Ravallion (2003), by 
supporting minimum levels of consumption, helping credit-constrained poor people be 
productive workers, and providing incentives for long-term investments in human capital, 
safety nets are seen as having a potentially important role in compensating for the market 
failures that help perpetuate poverty, particularly in high inequality settings.  Das, Do and 
Ozler (2004) expand on this line of thinking, pointing out that conditionalities can be used 
to internalize positive externalities such as children’s education and health that would 
otherwise not be captured. 
 
With their emphasis on human capital accumulation and long-term poverty reduction, 
conditional cash transfers are perhaps the clearest  policy manifestation of this new 
thinking on the long-term role of social assistance programs.  The technical design features 
of CCTs associated with this evolution are discussed in more detail below. Political 
discussions and popular debate also reflect this new emphasis, with a generalized 
acceptance of these new programs’ emphasis on work, on investing in human capital 
(especially children), on temporary assistance and on co-responsibility.  The work 
requirements that have been introduced as part of the restructuring of the flagship U.S. 
cash transfer program can be included as part of this evolution in thinking that has crossed 
party lines.  These features have played an important role in generating support for these 
programs, highlighting the importance of the political economy of implementing this new 
generation of programs.   
 
Social assistance programs have also been subject to a number of criticisms, many of 
which are often leveled at social programs more generally.  Though these criticisms don’t 
always have a strong empirical basis, they have been an important factor in shaping the 
evolution of social assistance policy, particularly as concerns conditional cash transfers.  
One common criticism involves poor poverty targeting, though a review by Coady, Grosh 
and Hoddinott (2003) revealed that only up to one-fourth of the social assistance programs 
in developing countries had regressive poverty t argeting, but that that there was   4
tremendous variability in progressiveness across types of programs, suggesting that it is 
not so much the type of program that determines targeting effectiveness, but rather its 
implementation. Second, social assistance programs are often accused of having high 
administrative costs or excessive costs of components such as materials in workfare 
programs that reduce the percentage of resources actually transferred to vulnerable 
families.  Again, empirical reviews of administrative costs show high variance across types 
of social programs, including social assistance programs, from 0.4 percent to 29 percent 
(Grosh 1994).  Fourth, reviews of countries’ social safety net strategies often point to 
social assistance programs being c omposed of a collection of small, often disparate 
projects with a multiplicity of overlapping or unrelated goals (Marques, 2003).  Finally, 
there have been criticisms of paternalism, clientelism and corruption in social assistance 
programs, many of which have been perceived as vehicles for political patronage.   
 
Beyond the realm of social assistance, conditional cash transfer programs are also a 
response to the perceived failure of traditional supply side interventions such as schools 
and health clinics to effectively reach the poor.  Research has documented that these 
services have often been underutilized by the poor because of unmanageable out of pocket 
expenditures, high opportunity costs, difficult access, and a lack of incentives for investing 
in children’s human capital.  Though CCTs can provide incentives for using these services, 
as is argued below, CCTs are not a substitute for the provision of quality supply-side 
investments nor are they designed to address supply-side issues.  Yet the target population 
is critically dependent upon access to high quality health and education services, and issues 
of access and quality which CCTs cannot address loom large.  The provision of quality 
health and education services should be a pre-requisite to the implementation of a CCT 
program lest the transfer be conditioned upon the mandated use of poor quality, ineffective 
services with little hope for anticipated welfare impacts, particularly over the long-term.   
 
III.  Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Overview
3 
 
The conditional cash transfer programs reviewed in this paper combine several key 
program design elements:  the provision of cash, targeted to poor households, based on  
conditionalities tied to investments in education and, often, health and nutrition.  
Numerous other programs share one or more of these design elements, and each of these 
design elements could be incorporated into a program without the others.  Indeed on of the 
challenges is assessing CCT programs is the inability to ‘unbundle’ the intervention to 
understand which component can be linked to which outcomes.   
 
Education and Health Components 
There are two components associated with most conditional cash transfer programs:  an 
education component and a health/nutrition component.  The education component 
consists of a cash grant targeted to primary school-age children. In countries with higher 
educational attainment such as Mexico, Colombia and Jamaica, this component also seeks 
to benefit secondary school-age adolescents  (Table 1).  The receipt of education grants 
 
3 For a more in-depth description of CCT programs see Ilahi, et al. 2000, Legovini and Regalia 2001 and 
Morley and Coady  2003.  This section draws from Rawlings and Rubio 2004.   5
(and in some cases cash or in-kind support for school materials) is conditioned on school 
enrollment and regular school attendance (usually 80-85% of school days).  Given its 
objective of reducing child labor, Brazil’s PETI also requires participation in an after-
school program.   
The levels and objectives of the education grants vary considerably across countries (see 
Table 2).  In Mexico and Honduras, the education grant covers both direct costs (school 
fees, school supplies, transportation costs, etc.) as well as opportunity costs derived from 
the income lost as a result of sending children to school rather than work.  In Colombia and 
Mexico educational grants for secondary school are higher than for primary school to 
reflect the increasing opportunity cost of work as children grow older.  In Mexico, grants at 
the secondary level are higher for females to provide an added incentive for reversing a 
pattern of unequal gender participation in secondary education and to internalize education 
externalities that accrue as they raise families of their own (Skoufias, 2001).  
Health and nutrition grants consist of a cash transfer aimed at food consumption, combined 
with an incentive for the provision of health care for children and nutrition education for 
mothers.  Receipt of the cash transfer is conditional on compliance by participating 
household members with a pre-determined number of health center visits and health and 
nutrition workshops  These grants are usually family-based and are targeted to newborn 
children up to the age of 2 or 3, and in some cases, children up to the time they enroll in 
primary school.  In Honduras, Jamaica and Mexico, pregnant and lactating women are also 
among program beneficiaries (see Table 2).  The value of the monthly cash grant per 
family for the health and nutrition component varies across countries.  In Honduras, for 
example, researchers calculated the level of the nutrition and health voucher as equivalent 
to the value of the time invested by the mother during the trip and waiting at the health 
center. In Colombia, the amount of the health and nutrition grant was set equivalent to the 
mean income required to allow an average indigent family to reach the extreme poverty 
line whereby they were able to consume a nutritiously adequate amount of food. 
Supply Side Support 
In some countries CCT programs go beyond providing demand-side monetary incentives 
to families by strengthening the supply of health and education services.  In Nicaragua, 
teachers receive a modest bonus per child participating in the program, half of which is 
intended to pay for school materials.  In addition, NGOs are contracted to provide health 
services.  In Mexico, resources are set aside to cover the costs of additional health services 
demanded due to the program and ensure an adequate supply of equipment, medicines and 
material.  In Honduras, the CCT program provides grants directly to schools and health 
centers as part of an experiment designed explicitly to compare the effectiveness of three 
alternative interventions combining demand and supply incentives. 
IV. An Innovation in Social Assistance 
Conditional cash transfer programs represent an innovation in the provision of social 
assistance.  The first generation of programs have proven successful in limiting some the 
arbitrariness associated with traditional social assistance programs and in achieving   6
concrete advances in human development, as evidenced by the evaluation results described 
in Section V.  As outlined below, these advances have  been achieved by introducing 
several key design features. 
 
Changing accountability relationships.  Conditional cash transfer programs address many 
of the criticisms levied at traditional social assistance programs by changing the 
accountability relationships between the national government, service providers in health 
and education, and poor households.  Through the provision of cash grants directly to poor 
households, CCT programs allow the national government to forge a one-on-one 
relationship with the target population, without the intermediation of local government or 
the use of local service providers.  CCT programs are commonly administered directly by 
the central government, including the identification of beneficiaries, verification of 
compliance and delivery of cash transfers.  CCT programs are promoted as fostering “co-
responsibility” between the government and families by requiring families to assume 
responsibility for schooling, health and the appropriate use of the cash grants.  This 
approach has been heralded as an alternative to more traditional, paternalistic approaches 
to social assistance and has helped counter criticisms of CCT programs as handouts.  
However, it has drawn criticism from others because CCT’s often centralized 
administration runs counter to efforts to support local governments and the decentralized 
provision of social services.  Other critics point to the problem of conditioning the transfer 
on the consumption of services of indeterminate value, effectively limiting the choices of 
the poor.  On another level, the provision of the grants to mothers in the household, 
combined with the election of mothers’ local representatives to serve as conduits between 
beneficiary families and the CCT program, has introduced changes in empowerment 
dynamics that are playing out in households and communities throughout the region, with 
reported positive and negative effects.  Finally, the conditionalities required by the CCT 
grants provide an incentive for poor households to use available health and education 
services, strengthening the link between service providers and the poor.  Indeed there is 
often an additional requirement for the provision of specific services for the target 
population such as training in health, hygiene and nutrition provided by health clinics for 
beneficiary families.  However, time allocation assessments have not been conducted to 
gain a clearer understanding of the level of commitment involved from mothers to meet 
these requirements, much less evaluations of the utility of these additional conditionalities 
with respect to health outcomes.  
 
 Addressing both current and future poverty. All CCT programs seek to foster human 
capital accumulation among the young as a means to breaking the inter-generational cycle 
of poverty, as well as provide income support as a means for improving consumption in 
the short-term.  Conditionalities provide the primary vehicle aimed at achieving long-term 
development impacts by providing the means to address market failures and internalize the 
positive externalities accrued through increased investments in health and education among 
the young.  These dual objectives are present in all programs, but the balance between the 
two varies considerably from program to program.  For example, in Colombia the CCT 
program  Familias en Acción was introduced as the cornerstone of a broader safety net 
program designed to protect the poor during a period of economic crisis.  It was designed 
as a counter-cyclical instrument, and has received financing for the expected duration of   7
the economic crisis.  By contrast, in Jamaica, Mexico, and now Brazil, CCT programs have 
been introduced to replace an existing array of less efficient social assistance programs and 
have been adopted as cornerstones in each country’s national welfare strategy.   
 
Targeting the poor.  Poverty targeting mechanisms can provide effective channels for 
reaching the poor, minimizing errors of inclusion and exclusion, but these efficiencies 
must be balanced against increased administrative costs and other problems often 
associated with targeting, including opportunities for corrupt behavior on the part of 
officials, and for beneficiaries, perverse incentives to remain part of the target population 
and social stigma. In assessing this balance, CCT program designers have opted strongly in 
favor of targeting and most CCT programs use both geographic and household level 
targeting to channel scarce resources to poor areas and households (Table 3).  A variety of 
approaches are used to identify poor areas,   depending primarily on the type of data 
available and ranging from a marginality index based on census data in Mexico to the 
Height Census of First Grade School Children in Honduras.  In most countries, the 
selection of eligible communities also includes a consideration of the supply capacity to 
respond to the increased demand in health and education services.  At the household level, 
many programs are experimenting with proxy-means tests that estimate households’ 
poverty levels as a criteria for program participation.  These tests use easily-measured 
characteristics such as the physical properties of a dwelling as a proxy for amore in-depth 
measure of poverty, such as income or consumption.  In many countries these proxy means 
tests have been adopted from other programs for use in identifying CCT beneficiaries or 
are being adopted by other programs once introduced as part of the CCT program, creating 
economies of scale and  promoting the use of empirical data for determining program 
eligibility.  As a consequence of this aggressive prioritization of the poor, in the countries 
where they have been introduced, initial results suggest that CCTs are among the better 
targeted social assistance programs.  From the perspective of the criticisms outlined earlier, 
while CCT programs as currently designed minimize labor disincentives by focusing on 
children and using proxy means tests to target the poor thereby minimizing price effects, 
the income effect with respect to the parents remains unaddressed. 
 
Providing cash.  The use of cash is seen as having many advantages over the provision of 
in-kind transfers, food stamps, vouchers or the use of generalized subsidies.  First, it 
addresses information asymmetries by giving households discretion over how to best 
allocate t he assistance received, be it on food, health care, housing or other needed 
expenditures.  It also avoids the creation of secondary markets and price distortions that 
often arise from the provision of goods, and facilitates targeting since cash transfers allow 
for less errors of inclusion than other approaches such as generalized subsidies.  The 
transfer of cash is generally more cost-effective since it involves lower transaction costs 
that other types of transfers, particularly in-kind transfers, and allows benefits to be 
transferred directly to households, as opposed to being spent on materials – a common 
criticism of workfare programs. Finally, the use of cash also allows policymakers to adjust 
the level of the transfer over time and across populations.   
  
Fostering synergies in human development.  By focusing on health, nutrition and 
education, most CCT programs recognize and foster the complementary relationships   8
between these elements of human capital development that are crucial to breaking the 
inter-generational transmission of poverty.  This direct fostering of the synergies between 
these areas is also a  recognition of the evidence concerning the ineffectiveness of certain 
human capital investments, such as education, without the provision of other basic inputs, 
such as adequate nutrition. 
 
Using evaluations strategically.  Unlike most development initiatives, many CCT 
programs have used impact evaluations to provide an empirical basis for guiding the 
introduction of a fairly large-scale social experiment.  These evaluations have formed a 
cornerstone of the policy initiative and have been carefully planned well in advance with 
strong support from program staff and policymakers. As explained in the next section, 
these evaluations are technically rigorous and have already provided evidence regarding 
these programs’ effectiveness.  The provision of sound, empirically based evidence on 
effectiveness has facilitated the scaling up of CCT programs nationally, their adoption 
internationally, and their continuity from one political regime to another.   
 
V. Evaluation Designs and Results to Date
4 
 
This section reviews the evaluation strategies applied in the first generation of CCT 
programs in Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua.  Each of these programs 
prioritized the early use of robust evaluations that included baseline and follow-up data, as 
well as the use of comparison groups, as a key element for informing program design and 
expansion.  These technically rigorous impact evaluations provide empirically-based 
evidence to explore whether the welfare effects observed are indeed attributable to the 
CCT program interventions, and not other factors. 
 
The CCT programs in Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua used gradual geographic 
implementation in order to randomly incorporate beneficiaries as the program expanded, 
taking advantage of the opportunities provided by logistical complexities, fiscal constraints 
and uncertainty about the magnitude of program impacts.  This randomized approach to 
program implementation allowed for the introduction of an experimental evaluation 
design, using the first areas to receive the program as the treatment group and the last as 
the control group.  Experimental designs are generally regarded as the most robust type of 
evaluation methodology since the process of randomization ensures equivalency in the 
treatment and control groups (Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey, 1999; Grossman, 1994).   
The Familias en Acción program in Colombia and the PETI program in Brazil used quasi-
experimental designs, specifically matching methods. Matching consists of constructing a 
comparison group by selecting non–program participants comparable in essential 
characteristics to participants.  Although not generally considered as rigorous as 
experimental designs, these approaches can provide credible evidence of program impact, 
especially when combined with the use of both baseline and follow-up data on treatment 
and comparison groups.  
 
4 The evaluation designs and results summarized in this section are discussed at greater length in Rawlings 
and Rubio (2004).   9
Results to Date 
Evaluation results are available for PROGRESA in Mexico, PETI in Brazil, the RPS pilot 
in Nicaragua and  Familias en Acción in Colombia.  These evaluations reveal that 
conditional cash transfer programs are administratively efficient and serve as an effective 
means for promoting human capital accumulation among poor households.   
1.  Education 
In education
5, CCT programs have demonstrated a positive effect on enrollment rates for 
both boys and girls.  
•  In Mexico, primary school enrollment rates before PROGRESA were between 90 
and 94 percent. Estimates of program impact controlling for household and 
community characteristics range between 0.74 and 1.07 percentage points for boys 
and 0.96 to 1.45 percentage points for girls. At the secondary level, baseline 
enrollment rates were 67 and 73 percent for girls and boys respectively.  Estimates 
of program impact for girls range from 7.2 to 9.3 percentage points and from 3.5 to 
5.8 for boys.  
•  In Colombia, the Familias en Acción program has raised enrollment rates among 
the primary school age population (7-13 years old) 1-2 percentage points from a 
baseline value of 92% in rural areas, but has had no impact on raising already high 
enrollments of 94% in urban areas.  Among the secondary school age population 
(14-17 years old) in rural areas, enrollment rates have gone up 4-6 percentage 
points from a baseline value of 50%, while impressive gains of 12-14 percentage 
points have been made in urban areas from a baseline value of 64%. 
•  In Nicaragua, program impacts are even more impressive. Average primary school 
enrollment rates in treatment areas increased nearly 22 percentage points as a result 
of the program from a low starting point of 68.5 percent.  
Program impact on attendance rates are mixed.  In Nicaragua, the evaluation indicates a 
higher impact on attendance than on enrollment rates; the RPS produced an increase of 30 
percentage points in the percentage of children who had less than 6 unexcused school  
absences in a two-month period.  By contrast, the evaluation of PROGRESA showed more 
pronounced effects on enrollment that on attendance rates.  
Conditional cash transfers are also effective in reducing child labor. In Mexico, the CCT 
program reduced the probability of working among aged 8 to 17 by 10 to 14% relative to 
the level observed prior to the program.  The impact is higher for boys aged 12 to 13 years 
old:  a 15 to 20% reduction in the probability of working relative to the level prior to the 
program, but no significant reduction was found for boys aged 16 to 17.  For girls, there 
was also a significant reduction in the probability of working despite their overall lower 
participation in the labor market (Parker and Skoufias, 2000).  In Brazil, the evaluation 
 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of education impacts see Schultz, 2000a-c; Behrman, Sengupta and Todd, 
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shows that as a result of participating in the PETI program, the probability of working fell 
between 4-7 percentage points in Pernambuco, close to 13 percentage points in Sergipe and 
nearly 26 percentage points in Bahia which has the highest child labor force participation 
rate in Brazil – 38 percent of children aged 7 to 14 (Yap, Sedlacek and Orazem 2001). 
Moreover, PETI also decreased the probability of children working in higher risk 
activities.  Nonetheless the program is less successful in limiting the probability of 
working 10 hours or more.  Another interesting result is that even though the after-school 
program was available to all households in PETI municipalities, only children in 
households that received the cash transfer spent significantly more time in school. This 
suggests that demand incentives may have an important role in accelerating behavioral 
changes.  
2.  Health and Nutrition 
Child health and nutrition has also improved as a result of CCT programs.  
•  In Mexico, the PROGRESA evaluation shows a significant increase in nutrition 
monitoring and immunization rates.  Infants under three years old participating in 
PROGRESA increased their growth monitoring visits between 30 to 60 percent, 
and beneficiaries aged 0 to 5 had a 12 percent lower incidence of illness compared 
to non-PROGRESA children (Gertler, 2000).  In addition, the data suggest that 
PROGRESA has had a significant impact on increasing child growth and lowered 
the probability of child stunting for children aged 12 to 36 months old (Behrman 
and Hoddinott, 2000). 
•  In Colombia, the proportion of children under 6 enrolled in growth monitoring is 
up 37 percentage points.  The incidence of acute diarrhea in children under 6 was 
reduced by 10 percentage points in urban areas and 5 percentage points in rural 
areas, but there has been no measured impact to date on the probability of 
malnutrition.    
•  In Nicaragua, approximately 60 percent of children less than 3 years old 
participated in nutrition monitoring before the RPS was implemented.  After a few 
months of program operation, more than 90 percent of children in RPS areas 
benefited from nutrition monitoring compared to only 67 percent in control areas.  
In terms of immunization rates, the RPS increased timely immunization among 
children 12-23 months old by 18 percentage points (IFPRI 2002a). 
Consumption levels have also improved as a result of participating in CCT programs.  In 
Mexico, the average consumption level of PROGRESA households increased by 14 
percent, and median food expenditures after just over a year of program operation were 11 
percent higher compared to non-PROGRESA households.  The increase in household 
consumption is in large part driven by higher expenditures on fruits, vegetables, and 
animal products.  Median caloric acquisition in PROGRESA households increased by 7.8 
percent (Hoddinott, et. al. 2000).  In Colombia, improvements in the dietary i ntake of 
treatment households was also observed.  In Nicaragua, control households experienced a 
sharp decline in consumption due in part to low coffee prices and a drought, whereas the   11
average per capita annual household expenditures in RPS areas did not change (IFPRI 
2002a).  The net program impact translates into a 19 percent increase in per capita 
consumption and suggests that CCT programs may help poor people protect consumption 
in times of crisis, a risk management role worthy of further analysis. 
3.  Efficiency 
CCT programs’ efficiency in terms of targeting and costs has also been evaluated.  A 
recent review of CCT programs’ targeting concludes that on average 81% of CCT program 
benefits go the poorest 40% of families (Grosh, Coady and Hoddinott, 2003).  In Mexico, 
the evaluation revealed that CCT investments are delivered in a cost-effective manner. As 
discussed in Coady 2000, the administrative costs of delivering cash transfers to poor 
households appear to be small relative to the costs of previous Mexican programs as well 
as to targeted programs in other countries.  For every 100 pesos allocated to the program 
8.9 pesos are absorbed by administrative costs. The largest components are the costs 
associated with targeting at the household level (nearly 30 percent), followed by the costs 
associated with conditioning the receipt of transfers (26 percent).    
VI.  Reflections on Program Design and Evaluation Results 
 
Conditional cash transfer programs have been successful in achieving important gains both 
regarding the provision of immediate short-term assistance and regarding longer-term 
human capital development impacts. In contrast to many development programs, the recent 
expansion of conditional cash transfer programs throughout the Latin America and 
Caribbean region is based on solid evidence of program impact, albeit from a handful of 
programs.  Evaluation results from the first generation of CCT programs in Brazil, Mexico, 
and Nicaragua show that they are an effective and efficient means for transferring income 
to the poor and for promoting human capital accumulation among poor households. In 
particular, there is clear evidence of program success in increasing enrollment rates, 
improving preventive health care and raising household consumption.   
 
Despite these promising results, several concerns have been voiced about the design of 
CCT programs, about their replicability and sustainability, and about their prioritization 
relative to other public investment options.  These are discussed below. 
Institutional design: the unfinished agenda 
Concerns have been raised with respect to the institutional design of conditional cash 
transfer programs and the related accountability relationships between central 
governments, local governments and clients.  Critics contend that although CCTs represent 
a creative approach to providing social assistance, they constitute an ‘end-run’ around the 
more difficult task of reforming inefficient public services.  In this respect, CCTs are 
subject to the same criticisms as social funds and education vouchers, both of which have 
been identified as strategies for bypassing non-responsive bureaucracies.  The risk here is 
that the relatively rapid creation of pockets of effective service delivery allow politicians to 
respond (albeit often effectively) to pressing needs, but ultimately undermine necessary, 
difficult and time-consuming efforts at broader public sector reform.     12
Of particular concern to CCT programs is the related lack of coordination with traditional 
providers of health and education services.  Without greater attention to the provision of 
quality services, CCT program conditionalities run the risk of mandating the poor’s use of 
low quality services, tying them to ineffective service providers and undermining the 
potential impact of CCT programs on long-term welfare impacts.  This is related to 
concerns about the geographical selection criteria applied by most CCT programs which 
can leave out poor areas with limited health and education supply capacity, or limited 
financial infrastructure. Since the evaluation results are only generalizable to the 
population of similar individuals and areas from which the sample was drawn and for 
which the counterfactual was constructed, results to date have shed little light on this 
debate.  These supply-side concerns have led to calls for renewed attention to the basic task 
of providing accessible, high quality health and education services in poor areas. 
A related concern involves the role of local government.  Although administrative 
arrangements vary considerably across programs, CCT programs (especially those with 
highly centralized administration such as Mexico and Colombia) have been accused of  
undermining local governments’ effectiveness by bypassing their authority.  This concern 
has particular resonance in countries where democratically-elected governments are in 
their infancy, where efforts are being made to strengthen the capacity and autonomy of 
local governments, and where central governments have a long tradition of clientelism and 
paternalism.  Strong centralization also limits the program’s ability to address 
beneficiaries’ needs and build in local response mechanisms for basic operational tasks 
such as targeting, verifying compliance with conditions or addressing beneficiaries’ 
concerns. It may also limit the programs’ ability to effectively coordinate with service 
providers in health and education.  To address many of these concerns, CCT programs 
have set up channels through groups of mothers’ representatives who act as conduits of 
information between the centrally administered program and the local beneficiaries.  This 
system has led to the empowerment of women and provided a channel for communication 
with local communities, but operates independently of elected local officials. 
The transformation of CCT programs into cornerstones of several countries’ social 
assistance policies has also raised questions concerning their position within the broader 
social security system.  At the forefront of the policy debate on CCT programs  are 
questions regarding how to structure incentives and administrative processes within CCT 
programs to encourage families to graduate from social assistance; questions on how to 
ensure the adequate coverage of a social protection system serving the needs of the poor 
and non-poor alike, irrespective of their labor market status; and how to structure a 
coherent, integrated social protection system that is both tailored and flexible so that the 
needs of particular populations are addressed even as their circumstances change.  Several 
programs in Latin America are at the forefront of addressing these concerns. Jovenes con 
Oportunidades in Mexico provides CCT beneficiaries who finish secondary school with a 
stipend that can be used for savings, education or housing. Chile’s  Puente program 
combines the provision of a temporary cash grant with intensive family-based psychosocial 
support provided by a social worker to help families reach established minimum levels of 
well-being in identified areas including employment, health, education and family 
dynamics, often through links with other social programs.    13
Targeting concerns 
Beyond the geographical targeting concerns discussed above, there are questions about the 
effectiveness of and need for the household targeting mechanisms used by CCT programs.  
The proxy means tests used to target individual households within poor communities as 
well as the practice of targeting of women as the transfer recipients, has been criticized for 
fostering discord within households and communities, and has been put forward as 
inappropriate in particular situations such as indigenous communities where collective 
decisionmaking and the provision of group-based benefits are valued. Second, the fact that 
household-level proxy means tests that are often based on criteria unknown to potential 
beneficiaries has invited criticism because the selection of beneficiaries is often perceived 
as arbitrary.
6  Third, existing targeting mechanisms and program requirements may not be 
appropriate to specific  vulnerable groups, such as the disabled, who may have trouble 
meeting program requirements; or mobile populations such as migrant workers or those 
displaced by violence since their eligibility is not portable.  Fourth, limiting the program to 
families with children excludes a set of needy individuals – notably the elderly poor – 
whose need for at least the transfer component of the program may be considerable.  
Finally, if CCT programs are to be used as safety net mechanisms for addressing short-
term consumption needs during periods of crisis (as has recently been suggested by 
experience in Nicaragua during the coffee crisis), the use of a static measure of poverty 
such as proxy means tests may not be as appropriate as other more dynamic targeting 
approaches such as self-selection. 
Sustainability and replicability issues 
There are concerns about the long-term sustainability of both the programs themselves and 
their achieved welfare impacts.  Many of the programs are financed through a combination 
of general tax revenues and international lending, with the latter raising questions about the 
long-term viability of the programs particularly as they become an increasingly integral 
part of countries’ social assistance strategies.  With respect to the sustainability of the long-
term welfare impacts, fortunately, most of the impact evaluations have contemplated 
follow-up studies so that at least the medium-term welfare impact of the programs can be 
determined.  Long-term evaluations are needed, however, to assess the crucial question 
regarding CCT programs’ ability to break the inter-generational transmission of poverty.  
The question of context looms large as policymakers assess the ability to translate the 
initial successful experience of a handful of programs in their early stages of operation into 
generalizable lessons, applicable under a variety of circumstances. Certain situations raise 
questions about the external validity of the evaluation results.  For example: Can these 
programs function as successful safety n ets in times of crisis; would they need to be 
adapted to target vulnerable populations affected by the crisis?  How should the education 
component of the program be adapted –or is it even needed? – in areas with high school 
enrollment rates?  Can the programs be successfully exported to countries where the 
 
6 see Adato (2000) and Adato, de la Brière, Mindek, and Quisumbing. (2000) for additional information on 
the effect of CCT programs on intra-household and community relations.   14
administrative infrastructure for successful program implementation (for monitoring 
compliance, ensuring timely payments, etc.) may be limited?  Are there ways to introduce 
the programs in geographical areas with limited health and education supply capacity, 
perhaps through mobile health clinics and other innovations?  Are these programs 
appropriate for populations with particular characteristics such as the indigenous or the 
disabled?  These questions remain unanswered, but have gained particular relevance as 
conditional cash transfer programs have been scaled up within countries, such as the recent 
expansion into urban areas in Mexico, and adopted internationally as is now being 
contemplated in parts of Africa and Asia.  
The scope of conditional cash transfer programs 
Related to the question of context are questions of scope.  Conditional transfers are clearly 
useful when there are both immediate consumption needs combined with constraints faced 
by poor households with young families to using available, high quality health and 
education services.  It is not clear that this situation is always the one encountered, for 
example, among populations with high levels of school enrollments.  Indeed, striking a 
balance between the short-term poverty alleviation objectives and the long-term human 
capital accumulation objectives presents policy challenges.  DeJanvry and Sadoulet (2003) 
argue that  Oportunidades’ long-term human capital accumulation objective is of pre-
eminent importance and would be best met by changing the program’s targeting strategy to 
focus it directly on the population most at risk for being out of school. In a review of 
education-focused conditional cash transfer programs, Morley and Coady (2003) use data 
from the Nicaraguan and Mexican CCT programs to estimate the short-run poverty effects 
as well as the long-run effects of investing in human capital accumulation based on 
estimations of the future earnings of beneficiaries.  They conclude that for every dollar 
received by the poor as a transfer, the present value of future earnings go up by 1.52 in 
Mexico and 1.13 in Nicaragua, implying that the benefit from the investment component is 
of greater value than the transfer component. Bourgignon, Ferreira and Leite (2002) reach 
a similar conclusion pointing to the relatively greater poverty alleviation benefits of the 
conditionalities, as compared to the benefits of the transfer alone, in their ex-ante 
simulation of the benefits of Brazil’s Bolsa Escola program.  
 
A debate has arisen about the concurrent need for addressing issues beyond the current 
scope of CCT programs, particularly the promotion of income generating activities among 
poor households, which is seen by many as a natural complement and necessary condition 
for the sustainability of human capital investment of future generations.  However, it is far 
from obvious that CCT programs themselves should take on this additional objective. It 
may well be that a better solution is to focus on the creation or strengthening of separate 
income generation programs, while ensuring adequate coordination with CCT and other 
poverty reduction programs, as is done in the Chilean Puente program. So far, the tendency 
in Mexico as well as Nicaragua has been to expand the mandate of CCT programs to 
include training and other activities to promote income generation.  Fortunately, both 
programs are planning to conduct evaluations of these initiatives that will help inform the 
current debate.     15
There are some critical questions about trade-offs that are likely to remain the subject of 
considerable debate.  There are basic questions about the optimal balance between the twin 
objectives of short-term poverty alleviation and the long-term human capital development, 
as well as between transfer sizes and numbers of beneficiaries.  On a broader scale, there 
are fundamental questions about the optimal use of resources to achieve specific policy 
objectives.  For example, would the resources devoted to CCT programs be better spent 
ensuring the availability of key inputs such as vaccinations, schoolbooks or preventative 
health campaigns?  Answers to these questions can be informed by empirical evidence but 
are likely to remain the subject of considerable debate, with decisions most likely taken in 
light of policy priorities and budgetary constraints. 
Finally, it is becoming increasingly recognized that CCT’s are but one instrument in what 
needs to be a comprehensive approach to social protection.  First, despite CCT’s  
recognized success in reaching the extreme poor, many of the extreme poor who would 
otherwise qualify for the program have been left untouched by CCT programs even in 
countries with national coverage, either because they live in areas without schools, health 
clinics, banks or local administrative agencies; or because their conditions are such that 
even with the incentives provided by the CCT programs, households face constraints in 
taking advantage of these opportunities.  In situations such as these, which arise in all 
countries, the social protection network should be prepared to offer program alternatives 
and ensure that these are known, such as the social worker-based approach in Chile’s 
Puente program or the one-stop-shops for an array of social assistance programs in the 
U.S.  Second, while CCT programs have benefits for risk management, in other areas they 
are uncorrelated with risks frequently faced by households, particularly adult household 
members, such as job loss, natural disasters or health problems.  Third, CCTs are clearly 
inappropriate as currently designed for addressing the needs of poor households without 
young children.  This does not translate into a need for CCTs to address these needs, but it 
does call for a more coherent, integrated approach to social assistance than is currently 
found in most countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.  
VII.  Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
The experience with the rapid introduction of conditional cash transfer programs in Latin 
America and Caribbean holds several lessons regarding the reform of social assistance and 
the introduction of large-scale social experiments more generally.  
 
One of the first lessons is that substantial reform in the delivery of social services is 
possible within a short period of time under different country circumstances.  In just a few 
years, CCT programs have grown and multiplied rapidly, fueled by their compelling 
design features and promising evaluation results.  This experience provides an example of 
the speed with which innovation can be adopted and scaled up, following a dynamic 
demonstration effect.  
Second, the experience demonstrates the powerful role that can be played by the strategic 
use of sound impact evaluations.  In a radical departure from most social sector initiatives, 
notably in developing countries, impact evaluations were included as an integral part of the 
development and application of CCT programs.  These evaluations have served not only a   16
technical purpose in informing program expansion and modification decisions based on 
solid evidence of welfare impacts, but also a political purpose allowing policymakers to 
protect effective programs during political transitions and fueling their adoption 
internationally.  Evaluation results were critical to the preservation of CCT programs 
during political transitions in a number of countries where the norm in social assistance has 
been for each successive administration to ignore or discard previous efforts and come up 
with its own policy initiatives.  The practice of keeping established programs based on a 
review of empirically valid results is a watershed for both the practice of social assistance 
policy and for the sustainability of programs for the poor.  The difficulties overcome by 
CCT program administrators in ensuring that sound evaluations were carried out are also 
part of this important lesson, underscoring the need to secure a solid commitment from 
policymakers from the program design stage forward to maintain the integrity of the 
program and evaluation designs.  However, since few development initiatives have been 
evaluated as rigorously as CCT programs, a debate has arisen on whether other programs 
with similar objectives would have performed better or worse had they too been evaluated.  
It is difficult to judge the comparative effectiveness of CCT programs without evidence 
from alternatives, a situation calling for the expanded use of impact evaluations 
specifically and  results-based monitoring and evaluation systems more broadly as a 
foundation for effective program management.  
Finally, the continuing debate on CCT programs shows that there is no magic bullet for 
reforming social protection programs.  Although the evaluations of CCT programs have 
provided compelling evidence concerning their effectiveness, these programs cannot 
function effectively in isolation from the provision of quality health and education 
services, and while the new accountability relationships forged by CCT programs may 
solve certain problems they can also create new ones, particularly regarding community 
and household-level power relationships.  Nor are CCTs and related experiences with 
social funds and educational vouchers a substitute for the pressing need for fundamental 
reforms among traditional service providers.  The introduction of CCTs has not resolved 
longstanding issues of quality, efficiency and effectiveness within social sector ministries, 
across the myriad of often uncoordinated social assistance providers, and in often outdated 
and financially insolvent social insurance programs.  A challenge facing policymakers 
today is how to use the positive experiences gleaned from CCT’s commitment to poverty 
targeting, robust impact evaluation results, and financial efficiency as a platform for 
implementing reforms in other programs and sectors.  Indeed, few of the features of CCTs 
are necessarily specific to CCTs and it is possible that much of the success of CCT 
programs are not intrinsic to the program model, but instead attributable to sound technical 
design and creative innovations that could easily be incorporated into other programs.  
Context and scope must also be considered, recognizing that positive evaluation results 
from a handful of programs does not imply that these experiences can be replicated under 
different circumstances, or that CCT programs can be effective in addressing problems 
beyond those they have been designed to take on, or that CCTs are the best alternative to 
addressing a specific development challenge.   
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Table 1. Objectives, Components and Target Population of CCT Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Program  Objectives  Components  Target population 
    Education  Health and Nutrition  Education  Health and Nutrition 
Bolsa Escola, 
Brazil 
1.  Increase the educational attainment 
of school-age poor children  
2.  Reduce current and future poverty 
Cash grants  -  Poor children 6-15  - 
PETI, Brazil  Eradicate the worst forms of child labor 
(i.e. those involving a health risk), while 








1. Increase the human capital investment 
among extreme poor families 
2.  Serve as a safety net 
Bi-monthly school 
subsidy 
1.  Nutrition subsidy 
2.  Health education 
 
Poor households with 





Poor  households with 
children 0-6 not participating 
in other programs 
PRAF II, 
Honduras 
Increase the accumulation of human 
capital among children of the poorest 
families and thereby help to break the 
circle of poverty. 
1.  Demand incentives 
(educational 
voucher) 
2.  Supply incentives 
for primary schools 
1.  Demand incentives (nutrition 
and health voucher) 
2.  Supply incentives for health 
care centers 
3.  Nutrition training for mothers 
Poor households with 
children 6-12 who have 
not yet completed the 
4
th grade of primary 
school 
Poor households with 
pregnant women and/or 
children under three  
PATH, Jamaica  1.     Increase educational attainment, 
improve health outcomes, and thus 
reduce poverty.  
2.     Reduce current poverty 
3.  Reduce child labor 
4.  Serve as a safety net 
Education grant   1.  Health grant 
2.  Health education  
Poor households with 
children 6-17 
Poor households with 
children 0-5; pregnant and 
lactating women; elderly 
over 65; persons with 
disabilities; and destitute 




Improve the educational, health and 
nutritional status of poor families, 
particularly children and their mothers 
1.  Educational grants 
2.  Support for school 
materials 
3.  Strengthening the 
supply and quality 
of education 
services 
1.  Cash grant for food 
consumption 
2.  Basic health care services 
package 
3.  Nutrition and health education 
4.  Improved supply of health 
services 
5.  Nutrition supplements 
Poor households with 




grade) and secondary 
(3




Cash grants are targeted to 
poor households while 
nutrition supplements are 
targeted specifically to 
pregnant and lactating 
women, children 4-24 
months old and 





Promote human capital accumulation 
among households living in extreme 
poverty  
1.  Education grant 
2.  Support for school 
materials 
3.  Supply incentive 
1.  Cash grant for food  
2.  Nutrition and health education 
3.  Basic health care package for 
children under 5 
4.  Supply incentive 
Poor children 6-13 




Cash grants are targeted to 
poor households; health care 
services are targeted to 
children 0-5 
Source: Rawlings and Rubio, 2004 
 
 
7 In March 2002, PROGRESA changed its name to Oportunidades and broadened its objectives. The renewed program aims to create income generating opportunities for poor households through preferential 
access to microcredit, housing improvements and adult education.  
8 Since 2001, students up to 20 years old enrolled in high school are also eligible for education grants   21
Table 2. Conditionality and Transfer size of CCT Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Program  Conditionality
9  Transfer size 
  Education  Health and Nutrition 
 
Education  Health and Nutrition 
      Local Currency  Local Currency 
Bolsa Escola, 
Brazil 
At least 85% school attendance in 
a 3-month period 
-  R$15 – R$45 (US$6-19) per family per 
month 
- 
PETI, Brazil  At least 80% school attendance 
and participation in the after-
school program Jornada 
Ampliada 
-  Varies across states between $R25-39  






At least 80% school attendance in 
a 2-month cycle 
Regular health care visits for 
child’s growth and development 
monitoring 
Primary: Col$14,000 (US$6) per child per 
month 
Secondary: Col$28,000 (US$12)  per child 
per month 





School enrollment and maximum 
7 days of school absence in a 3-
month period. 
Compliance with the required 
frequency of health center visits 
Educational voucher:  
L$ 828 (US$58) per child per year 
Average supply incentive: L$57,940 
(US$4,000) 
/school/year 
Health voucher: L$660 (US$46.3) 
per family per year 
Avg. supply incentive 
L$87,315 
(US$6,020)/facility/year 
PATH, Jamaica  Minimum school attendance of 
85% (maximum 9 days of school 
absence per term 
Compliance with the required 
number of health visits per year, 
which varies by beneficiary 
age/status  
J$500 (US$9)/child/mo  J$500 (US$9)  per eligible 
household member per month 
PROGRESA, 
Mexico 
School enrollment and minimum 
attendance rate of 85%, both 
monthly and annually 
Compliance by all household 
members with the required 
number of health centers visits 
and mother attendance at health 
and nutrition lectures 
Primary: varies by grade US$8-
17/child/month + US$11/year/child for 
school materials 
Secondary: varies by grade and gender 
US$25-32/child/month + US$20/year/child 
for school materials
11 








School enrollment; less than six 
days of unexcused school absence 
in a two-month period school; and 
school grade promotion  
Regular health care visits for 
child’s growth monitoring;  up-to-
date vaccinations; and attendance 
to health and nutrition talks  
Grant: C$240 (US$17) every 2 months per 
family 
School material support: C$275 (US$20) 
per child per year 
Supply incentive: C$10 (US$0.7) per 
student every 2 months 
C$480 (US$34) per family every 
2 months 
Source: Rawlings and Rubio, 2004 
 
 
9 In practice, some programs have not enforced all conditions. For example, delays in the development of the  PRAF management information system prevented the 
enforcement of conditionalities during the first months of program implementation.  In Nicaragua, the practice of automatic grade promotion and problems with the 
supply of vaccine serums led to less stringent enforcement of conditions. 
10 In Bahia and Sergipe, the income transfer is R$25/per month for each child. In Pernambuco, the transfer is R$50 for 1-2 participating children, R$100 for 3-4 children 
and R$150 for 5 or more children. 
11 At the end of 1999, educational grants for primary school varied between Mex$80-165/child/month depending on the grade (3rd to 6
th); for secondary schools transfers 
varied from between mex$240-265/boy/month and Mex$245-305/girl/month. In addition, households received Mex$100 per year per primary school enrolled child and 
Mex$190 per year per secondary school enrolled child. 
12 The maximum monthly transfer per household per month is Mex$750 (approximately US$75)   22
Table 3. Selection criteria of CCT Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Program  Selection criteria 
  Geographic  Household level  Other 
Bolsa Escola, 
Brazil 
Participation at the municipal level is demand-
driven; there is geographic targeting within 
municipalities  
 
Eligible households must have a maximum income 
per capita of R$90 
Minimum residency requirement that varies between 
1 to 5 years depending on the municipality. 
Some municipalities require that beneficiary 
households are female-headed. 
PETI, Brazil  Municipalities with high incidence of child labor 
involving a health risk 
Eligible households must have a per capita income 





1.  Municipalities other than department capitals 
with less than 100,000 inhabitants 
2.  Municipalities not participating in other 
national programs with adequate supply of 
education and health services and a bank 
3.  Municipalities with available SISBEN database 
up-to-date  
Level 1 families of the SISBEN (local information 
system that identifies poor and vulnerable 
households according to a Basic Unmet Needs Index 




Municipalities with the lowest average height for age 
z-scores  
None   - 
PATH, Jamaica  All parishes participate in the program; funds are 
distributed across parishes depending on the poverty 
incidence 
Household eligibility is determined by a scoring 




Rural communities with a high marginality index 
with more than 50 and less than 2,500 inhabitants 
and access within a certain distance to primary and 
secondary school and health care center
13. 
Within eligible localities, beneficiary households are 
identified using discriminant analysis of household 
income and other characteristics. 
- 
Red de Protección 
Social, Nicaragua 
1.  Departments and municipalities with high 
extreme poverty incidence, good access to 
schools and health care centers, good transport 
and communication infrastructure and local 
capacity 
2.  Within eligible municipalities, census areas 
were classified in 2 groups according to a 
marginality index based on information on 
family size, access to basic sanitation and safe 
water, and literacy rates. The first group would 
participate in the pilot phase 1 while the second 
group would participate in the second pilot 
phase. 
Pilot phase 1: all households in selected census areas 
with less than 14.1 hectars and no vehicle participate 
in the program 
Pilot phase 2: household eligibility is determined by 
a scoring formula 
- 
Source: Rawlings and Rubio, 2004 
 
 
13 Since 2001, urban areas with a high marginality index have been incorporated in to the program. 